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John Callanan
Mendelssohn and Kant on Mathematics
and Metaphysics
Abstract: The difference between the method of metaphysics and the method of
mathematics was an issue of central concern for Kant in both the Pre-Critical and
Critical periods. I will argue that when Kant speaks of the ‘philosophical method’
in the Doctrine of Method in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), he frequently has
in mind not his own methodology but rather the method of conceptual analysis
associated with rationalism. The particular target is Moses Mendelssohn’s picture
of analysis contained in his submission for the 1763 Prize Essay competition. By
the time of the first Critique, I argue, Kant wants to maintain his own longstand-
ing commitment to the distinctness of the methods of metaphysics and mathe-
matics. However, Kant wants to use this same analysis of the source of the dis-
tinction to diagnose the origins of the dogmatism that is engendered by the
method of the rationalists.
1 Introduction
It is frequently held that a central claim of Kant’s Critical philosophy was that
the method of mathematics is essentially different from that of metaphysics. A
typical recent explanation of Kant’s central claim puts it as follows:
According to Kant’s Transcendental Doctrine of Method, philosophy cannot be developed
along the lines of the definitions-axioms-proofs scheme that is known from mathematics,
and this is for the following reason: mathematics is based on pure intuition, while philos-
ophy is not…None of this can be done in philosophy, or so Kant argues, simply because our
abstract philosophical concepts do not exhibit the same kind of intuitive content. Hence,
philosophy cannot be done—even in parts—in the style of mathematics.¹
This is a familiar characterization of Kant’s approach.² Yet taken in its plainest
sense it must be incorrect. This can be seen from the simple point that for
Kant metaphysical concepts do of course contain intuitional content. The entire
strategic thrust of the Transcendental Analytic is just to show that synthetic a
 Leitgeb (2013, 270).
 See Carson (1999), De Jong (1995), Kemp Smith (2003), Kitcher (1975), Hintikka (1992), Shabel
(2006).
priori knowledge in metaphysics is possible just because the concepts that we
deploy are ones that require a schematization relating to intuition in order to
manifest their Sinn und Bedeutung – by inquiry from concepts alone we are
not “in the least being able to show whence they could have their application
and their object, thus how in pure understanding without sensibility they
could have any significance and objective validity” (Critique of Pure Reason
(CPR) A 242/B 299–300).³
In the first section of the first chapter of Transcendental Doctrine of Method
(‘the discipline of pure reason in dogmatic use’),⁴ where Kant unpacks the mean-
ing of the mathematical method, the account cannot connote the relating of a
concept to an intuition simpliciter, since one of Kant’s explicit claims in the Cri-
tique is that in metaphysics too contentful cognition occurs only if there are in-
tuitions present corresponding to the concepts deployed in judgment.⁵ In this re-
gard, Kant is clear that metaphysics is akin to mathematics:
But if we consider these principles of pure understanding in themselves as to their origin,
then they are anything but cognitions from concepts. For they would not even be possible a
priori if we did not bring in pure intuition (in mathematics) or the conditions of a possible
experience in general. (CPR A 301/B 357 – emphasis added)
There is then a puzzle with regard to the claims of the dogmatic use section. On
the one hand, Kant clearly maintains the distinctness of the methods of meta-
physics and mathematics. On the other hand, it seems like drawing that distinc-
tion in terms of a criterion concerning concepts involving intuitional content
runs precisely against Kant’s own vision of metaphysics, and indeed places
his inquiries on the wrong side of the metaphysics/mathematics distinction.
This puzzle can be resolved though by considering the Pre-Critical origins of
the dogmatic use section. Specifically, I claim that the section ought to be
read as a continuation of Kant’s engagement with Mendelssohn on just this
question of the distinctness of the methods of mathematics and metaphysics
that began with their submissions to the 1763 Berlin Prize Essay competition.
 See CPR A 50/B 74, A 79/B 104–105, A 139– 140, B 178–179, A 155–156/B 194– 195, A 258/B
314. All English translations of Kant are from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel
Kant. All references to Kant’s works are to the volume and page number of the Akadamie-
Ausgabe (AA), except the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), which uses the standard A/B-edition
pagination.
 Henceforth the ‘dogmatic use section’.
 E.g. CPR A 51/B 75. I’ll follow Allison (2004) in referring to Kant’s ‘discursivity thesis’ as the
claim that concepts and intuitions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for know-
ledge.
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Firstly, I will argue that when Kant speaks of the ‘philosophical method’ in
the dogmatic use section, he means to critically engage with rationalism’s tradi-
tional reliance upon conceptual analysis as the central means of inquiry. Kant’s
own transcendental methodology is better understood as sharing with the meth-
od of mathematics the claim that the veridical deployment of concepts requires
the informing of those abstract discursive representations with possible intui-
tional content. Kant nevertheless also maintains the distinctness of the methods,
and attempts to retain a sense whereby philosophy is still properly understood
as reasoning from concepts, albeit not in the unchecked rationalist sense. As
such, the dogmatic use section’s ambiguity stems from the double duty that it
is intended to satisfy: on the one hand, Kant wants to maintain his own long-
standing commitment to the distinctness of the methods of metaphysics and
mathematics; on the other hand, Kant wants to use this same examination of
the source of the distinction to diagnose the origins of the dogmatism that is en-
gendered by the method of the rationalists.
Kant’s desire to set metaphysics on the “secure course of a science” de-
mands that the metaphysician attend to the methodology that she employs in
her task, and it is this aspect of metaphysical inquiry that she has to date ne-
glected (CPR B xiv). This contrasts, he thinks, with the case of other sciences,
where progress has been achieved just because the scientist has paid heed to
the methodological presuppositions in play when initially conceiving of the tar-
gets of those inquiries. Kant provides some detail with regard to the initial exam-
ple, that of the first unidentified geometer:
A new light broke upon the first person who demonstrated the isosceles triangle… For he
found that what he had to do was not trace what he saw in this figure, or even trace its mere
concept, and read off, as it were, from the properties of the figure, but rather that he had to
produce the latter from what he himself had thought into the object and presented (through
construction) according to a priori concepts, and that in order to know something securely
a priori he had to ascribe to the thing nothing except what followed necessarily from what
he himself had put into it in accordance with its concept. (CPR B xi-xii)⁶
The “revolution in thinking” that Kant later advocates in metaphysics is epito-
mized by the particular self-understanding of this first geometer’s own method,
and to this extent Kant clearly thinks there is something to be gained by imitat-
ing the methodology of geometry.
However, this prescription contrasts notably with Kant’s own more explicit
reservations expressed later in the Critique regarding the methods of the meta-
 Kant has Proposition I.5 of Euclid’s Elements in mind here – see Heath (1908, 251).
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physician and the mathematician. In the dogmatic use section Kant returns to
the theme of the difference between mathematical and “philosophical” cogni-
tion. Here the methods are contrasted as essentially different, and the difference
concerns the manner in which each operates with its concepts: whereas “[p]hi-
losophical cognition is rational cognition from concepts, mathematical cogni-
tion that from the construction of concepts. But to construct a concept means to
exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it” (CPR A 713/B 741). Here Kant
claims that the philosopher cannot mimic the method of the mathematician,
since the latter “constructs” concepts and in so doing gains an “intuitive” use
of reason, while the philosopher’s use of reason is merely “discursive”, i.e. in-
volves the manipulation of conceptual representations alone (CPR A 719/B
747). His conclusion is that “[t]here are thus two uses of reason,which regardless
of the universality of cognition and its a priori generation, which they have in
common, they are nevertheless very different in procedure” (CPR A 723/B 751).
Kant can be seen both as firstly demanding some shared methodology and
latterly denying that very possibility. Furthermore, Kant’s claim regarding the dif-
ference between the philosophical and mathematical methods in the dogmatic
use section doesn’t seem appropriate with regard to his own methodology. The
philosophical method is “rational cognition from concepts” and contrasts
with the mathematical method which performs rational cognition from the “con-
struction of concepts” (CPR A 713/B 741). Kant claims that “to construct a con-
cept means to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it” (ibid.). Construc-
tion requires the presentation of an a priori intuition, which Kant holds to be an
example of “a non-empirical intuition” (ibid.). In expressing the difference be-
tween an a priori intuition and an empirical one, Kant gives the example of a
triangle drawn in “mere imagination”, in contrast to an empirical one drawn
on paper (ibid.). The connotation attached to “non-empirical” seems to be that
of geometrical procedures pursued in what I’ll refer to as imaginational space,
in contrast to the empirical representations of physical space. Yet the contrast
here is still peculiar, since the implied connotation with regard to philosophical
cognition is that it proceeds without appeal to intuition generally, whether em-
pirical or non-empirical. Kant continues in the dogmatic use section by charac-
terizing a certain class of necessarily true propositions generated solely from
consideration of the relations between concepts as “dogmata” and claims that
in metaphysics properly conceived, there are no dogmata at all (CPR A 737/B
765). Again, the idea of philosophical cognition as “rational cognition from con-
cepts” if taken to mean ‘cognition from concepts alone’ would seem to preclude
Kant’s own metaphysical method.
In an attempt to explicate the difference between the mathematical and the
metaphysical methods, Kant makes a well-known appeal to proposition I.32 of
4 John Callanan
Euclid’s Elements, that the sum of the internal angles of all triangles are neces-
sarily equal to the sum of two right angles.⁷ However, the example here serves to
confuse rather than clarify the question. Here Kant considers two inquirers, a
metaphysician and a geometer, asked to investigate the nature of the concept
<triangle> in an attempt to derive a hitherto ungrasped truth about triangles gen-
erally. On Kant’s account, the metaphysician fails miserably – he returns with
clear and distinct concepts such as <straight line>, <three>, etc., but these are
just the sub-concepts contained in the concept of <triangle> given to him in
the first place. Therefore, the metaphysician “may reflect on this concept as
long as he wants, yet he will never produce anything new” (CPR A 716/B 745).
The geometer by contrast, by engaging in a process of diagrammatic reason-
ing, performs the proof procedure for proposition I.32, and discovers the proof.
In using this example though, it looks like Kant is again making just the wrong
kind of distinction for his purposes, since here it looks as if all the philosopher
can do is analyse the abstract content of the concept <triangle> (i.e. decompose it
into its constituent conceptual components) whereas the mathematician’s access
to the proof of proposition I.32 is secured by fact that she engages in “a chain of
inferences that is always guided by intuition” (CPR A 717/B 745). The point of the
example again seems to hinge on the characterization of the philosopher’s meth-
od as restricted to conceptual analysis. That precisely isn’t Kant’s own method-
ology though, so the example seems particularly ill-chosen if meant to illumi-
nate the proper procedure of metaphysics.
Consideration of both Kant’s and Mendelssohn’s Prize Essay submissions
can provide a context for the explanation of the source of this puzzle. In his sub-
mission Mendelssohn claimed that metaphysics could and should imitate geom-
etry in the latter’s method, which he claimed is that of analysis. Kant’s account
in the Critique of Pure Reason is motivated as a reaction against this fundamental
mischaracterization of the methodology of geometry that Mendelssohn put for-
ward. The discussion in the ‘dogmatic use’ section is complicated by Kant’s pur-
suing three distinct claims: firstly, he is expressing his longstanding commitment
to the claim that there is some important difference to be noted between meta-
physics and mathematics such that metaphysics cannot mimic mathematics;
secondly, that metaphysics in the rationalist tradition had sought to follow an
incorrect picture of mathematical practice; thirdly, that once the correct picture
of geometry is in place, both the differences and the elements in common be-
tween metaphysics and mathematics can be ascertained. The circumstances of
 Heath (1908, 316).
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Kant’s resolution of these issues, spurred by Mendelssohn’s submission, account
for the complex nature of Kant’s attack.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In § 2 I examine Kant’s account of
the difference between mathematical and metaphysical cognition in the Inquiry,
focusing on Kant’s early identification of the necessary role of the representation
of particulars for mathematics. In § 3 I examine Mendelssohn’s submission,
which claimed that mathematical knowledge could be secured through analysis.
In § 4 I turn to how Kant uses the example of I.32 to show how his new Critical
model of cognition allows him to explain the nature of the contribution of the
representation of particulars in a priori knowledge, a model that generalizes to
metaphysical knowledge. Once the proper mathematical method is shown,
Kant claims that we can see the paucity of the rationalist model of analysis.
In § 5 I conclude by examining the remaining senses in which Kant nevertheless
held that metaphysics is properly understood as cognition ‘from concepts’ and
that metaphysics and mathematics have distinct methods.
2 Mathematics and Metaphysics in the Inquiry
By 1763, when Kant was composing the Inquiry, he had already come to hold that
metaphysics had laboured under a misapprehension, namely that it could imi-
tate the methodology of mathematics. That this was impossible would have
been clear had metaphysicians paid sufficient attention to how mathematical
practice actually takes place, and specifically with regard to the crucial issue
of the conditions under which we come to possess mathematical concepts. In
mathematics we acquire the relevant concepts through a voluntary and creative
act of defining them, by bringing together sub-concepts into a synthetic whole:
There are two ways in which one can arrive at a general concept: either by the arbitrary
combination of concepts, or by separating out that cognition which has been rendered dis-
tinct by means of analysis. Mathematics only ever draws up its definitions in the first way.
For example, think arbitrarily of four straight lines bounding a plane surface so that the
opposite sides are not parallel to each other. Let this figure be called a trapezium. The con-
cept which I am defining is not given prior to the definition itself; on the contrary, it only
comes into existence as a result of that definition.Whatever the concept of a cone may or-
dinarily signify, in mathematics the concept is the product of the arbitrary representation of
a right-angled triangle which is rotated on one of its sides. In this and in all other cases the
definition obviously comes into being as a result of synthesis. (Inquiry, AA 2:276)
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Kant’s account depends on a distinction between concepts that are created and
those that are “given”.⁸ That a concept is given for Kant does not entail that it is
non-acquired, but rather that it has been acquired in some non-arbitrary manner
– presumably as being indispensable to the course of ordinary experience.⁹ By
contrast, a voluntarily created concept is marked by the ‘arbitrariness’ of this
act of creation. An arbitrary combination should not be taken to signify that
the propositional content expressible with the concept is contingent – it rather
merely marks the fact of the concept’s possession as contingent, since it has
taken place through a self-conscious decision to form that concept (presumably
without being prompted by the pragmatic needs that stimulate the acquisition of
given concepts). At this Pre-Critical stage, Kant held that the method of metaphy-
sics was that of analysis, which proceeded towards definitions through decompo-
sition of a concept into its fundamental sub-concepts. This presents the most im-
portant point of contrast with the method of geometry – “geometers acquire their
concepts by means of synthesis, whereas philosophers can only acquire their
concepts by means of analysis – and that completely changes the method of
thought” (AA 2:289).¹⁰
Kant holds that a singular difficulty for metaphysics stems from the fact that
the signs with which it performs its analysis are those of natural language. Lan-
guage is encumbered with a range of inherent vagaries, such as that “in meta-
physics in particular, words acquire their meaning as a result of linguistic
usage…it frequently happens that the same words are employed for concepts
which, while very similar, nonetheless conceal within themselves considerable
differences” (AA 2:284). However, even if the indeterminacy of natural language
use weren’t as difficult a problem as it is, the very type of sign that it employs
would still hamper metaphysics. This can be seen best by contrast with the
signs deployed in geometry. Kant’s account of geometrical knowledge hinges
upon the epistemic role of “individual signs” (AA 2:279). Individual signs are
representations whose explicit intensional content is the presentation of a partic-
ular: they present the universal “in concreto”. Linguistically expressed concepts
 See Jäsche Logic §§ 4–5, AA 9:93–94.
 Kant is not explicit however with regard to what in fact determines the parameters for gi-
venness in this sense.
 This confidence in the method of analysis as the sole one for metaphysics is abandoned by
the Critical period, and Kant claims that the method of the first Critique is synthetic (see
Prolegomena, AA 4:274). For discussion of Kant’s pre-Critical endorsement of conceptual ana-
lysis see Schönfeld (2000); for the meaning of the synthetic method in the first Critique, see de
Jong (1995) and Merritt (2006).
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“represent the universal in abstracto” (AA 2:279), i.e. they are representations
whose explicit intensional purport is to express generality.¹¹
The distinction between the two types of sign corresponds to the character-
istic representational function performed. Each sign-type offers a distinct way of
expressing a universal, e.g. triangularity can be expressed both through an
image of a token triangle or through the tokening of the word ‘triangularity’.
That the signs deployed in metaphysics are invariably signs in abstracto presents
an ironic impediment for the task of expressing universal and necessary truths.
In Kant’s view, signs in abstracto are clearly inferior to individual signs with re-
gard to their power to express universals. For example, an individual sign in ge-
ometry, such as an image of a triangle, provides a concrete example of the uni-
versal of triangularity. It is in the nature of triangularity itself that all triangles
consist of three straight lines laid end to end. The structure of the universal
can be expressed in terms of these other universals (‘straight’, ‘line’, ‘three’,
etc.) and their relations to each other. These very elements and their relations
are also expressed by the individual sign deployed: the drawing of the triangle
is also simply nothing but a unified image of three straight lines laid end to end.
Just as the universal can be decomposed into other constituent universals, so too
can the individual sign be decomposed into representational sub-components
that are themselves individual signs of just those corresponding constituent uni-
versals.
The individual sign of a triangle is thus structurally isomorphic with the uni-
versal it expresses – as Kant puts it, “in geometry the signs are similar to the
things signified” (AA 2:292). As such, it is expressively transparent with regard
to the structure of the universal it represents – one can just see in the features
of the image the properties of the universal that it represents. This contrasts
with the signs in abstracto that we deploy to signify the universal of triangularity
– the word ‘triangularity’ merely decomposes into a series of letters or pho-
nemes. Words cannot “show in their composition the constituent concepts of
which the whole idea, indicated by the word, consists” (AA 2:278–279).
This feature manifests itself not merely with regard to revealing the internal
structure of single individual signs but also with regard to their combinatorial
properties in propositional knowledge. Individual signs are distinct with regard
to the epistemic function of expressing the necessary truth of the propositions
concerning the relations between universals. Abstract signs, unlike individual
 My view of the epistemic role of signs in concreto (which is performed by intuitions in the
Critical system) is broadly in accord with Parson’s (1983) account. For differing accounts, see
Hintikka (1969), Howell (1973) and Thompson (1972).
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signs, are not “capable of indicating in their combinations the relations of the
philosophical thoughts to each other” (AA 2:279). Just as a given word is not
structurally isomorphic with the universal it seeks to express, neither are combi-
nations of words in sentences expressively transparent with regard to the prop-
ositional characterization of the relevant relations between universals. But this is
a feature of propositions expressed through the deployment of individual signs –
such a deployment can make evident the necessary connection between two or
more universals in a way that the activity of combining words in a sentence can-
not. The example given is that of a geometrical diagrammatic proof deployed to
express the infinite divisibility of space:
Suppose for example, that the geometer wishes to demonstrate that space is infinitely di-
visible. He will take, for example, from a straight line standing vertically between two par-
allel lines; from a point on one of these parallel lines he will draw lines to intersect the
other two lines. By means of this symbol he recognises with the greatest certainty that
the division can be carried on ad infinitum. (Inquiry, AA 2:279)
The example is one Kant used before in the Physical Monadology (AA 1:478 – see
Figure 1):
Figure 1: 
C
FE
P Q R 
Here the suasive force of mathematical proof is held to make essential use of in-
dividual signs – we can just see, in the visual and epistemic sense, that we can
continue to draw lines from point C intersecting further and further out along the
line EF ad infinitum. The proof procedures of metaphysics are hampered once
again just by their use of natural language. Kant runs through an argument
for the “claim that all bodies consist of simple substances” – he starts from
the two premises that bodies are composite wholes of substances, and that com-
position is an accidental property. Kant then suggests a thought experiment
whereby “all composition in a body could be suspended in imagination, but
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in such a way that the substances, of which the body consists, would continue to
exist” (AA 2:279). The non-compositional features of substances only obtain in-
sofar as they are simple, Kant claims, and so he concludes that all bodies are
composed of simple substances. Here however “neither figures nor visible
signs are capable of expressing either the thoughts or the relations which hold
between them… [t]he universal must rather be considered in abstracto” (AA
2:278–279).¹²
Although Kant maintained the security of mathematics, he was far more
doubtful regarding the state of metaphysics, claiming that “[m]etaphysics is
without doubt the most difficult of all the things into which man has insight.
But so far no metaphysics has ever been written” (AA 2:283). Kant’s dramatic pes-
simism here is explicitly linked to his claims regarding the processes of signifi-
cation and concept acquisition peculiar to mathematics and metaphysics. His in-
sistence that no metaphysics has yet been written is connected to his claim that
metaphysics had imitated the method of mathematics. The geometer justifiably
creates concepts in acts of definition and the metaphysician assumes that he
can do so also. The synthetic formation of metaphysical concepts however is un-
checked by the deployment of accompanying individual signs – the latter being
that which guarantees reference – and is thus simply an exercise in fiction.What
is validly defined in mathematics is merely invented in metaphysics.¹³
For this reason, Kant thinks, “nothing has been more damaging to philoso-
phy than mathematics, and in particular the imitation of its method in contexts
where it cannot possibly be employed” (AA 2:283). Yet this conclusion obscures
the crucial insight that Kant brings from the Inquiry to the Critique and which
motivates the discursivity thesis. In the Pre-Critical period, Kant had already
held that individual signs are the indispensable means for grasping necessary
truths about mathematical universals; according to the Critical model of cogni-
tion, all grasping of necessary truth must occur via the presentation of particu-
lars through intuition. The Inquiry thus marks a crucial step in Kant’s rejection of
the rationalist model of discursive cognition, since it is there that he first recog-
nizes the importance of resisting the thought that the appropriate manner of ex-
pressing truths about abstract entities, such as universals, is through the exclu-
sive use of abstract signs, such as concepts.
 Kant’s choice of example here is not arbitrary, since it concerns a conclusion that is directly
at odds with the conclusion of the preceding mathematical proof. This tension between the
conclusions of metaphysics and mathematics was one that concerned Kant throughout the pre-
Critical and Critical period, as Emily Carson has explored (see Carson 1999 and 2004).
 As examples of invented concepts Kant suggests Leibniz’s notion of a “slumbering monad”
(AA 2:277) – for discussion, see Carson (1999).
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3 Mendelssohn’s On Evidence
There are striking similarities between Kant and Mendelssohn’s submissions,
such as their shared opinion that metaphysics’ reliance upon natural language
as a source of its inferiority to mathematics. Mendelssohn also claims that the
“abstract signs” deployed in metaphysics guarantee that its proofs can never at-
tain the same “perspicuity” as found in mathematics.¹⁴ He holds that mathemat-
ical proofs, by contrast, use “essential signs” – signs that represent things “in
concreto” (265). Metaphysical proofs have to date all lacked perspicuity just be-
cause of their “type of notation” – “[t]hey lacked the aid of essential signs. Every-
thing in the language of philosophers remains arbitrary. The words and the con-
nections among them contain nothing that would essentially agree with the
nature of thoughts and the connections among them” (272).
The differences between the two submissions are also clear. The central dif-
ference is that, despite Mendelssohn’s claim regarding the inferior perspicuity of
metaphysical proof, he holds that there is no concern to be raised at all with re-
gard to the certainty of the properly performed results of metaphysical inquiry.
Metaphysical certainty is just the same as the certainty of geometry, simply be-
cause, the matter of sign usage aside, the inquiries employ exactly the same
method, that of analysis. Mendelssohn thus claims “it is possible, through inter-
locking inferences, to trace the most eminent truths of metaphysics back to such
principles which, as far as their nature is concerned, are as undeniable as the
first principles and postulates of geometry” (260).
For Mendelssohn, the “entire force” of geometrical certainty is acquired
through “the necessary connection of concepts”. This is due to the paired theo-
ries of inference and concepts to which he is committed. Mendelssohn considers
concepts as a kind of abstract sign with an infinitely dense substructure. He does
not concern himself with the account of where our concepts come from; rather,
he assumes that the concept possession conditions are irrelevant to the knowl-
edge acquisition process: since we do possess these concepts, and given that we
are in a position to ascertain necessary truths related to them, this achievement
must be explained by the fact that the possessed concepts contain within them a
potentially infinite store of necessary truths. He compares concepts to “seeds of
grain” which might have a mediocre outward appearance that belies the amount
that can be garnered from them, since every concept “is linked to endless truths
and can be reduced by analysis to other concepts and truths” (271).
 On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences, in Mendelssohn (1997).
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All inquiry is then just the analyzing of the core concepts relevant to a dis-
cipline. Geometry is a science that can be characterized as the single activity of
the analysis of the concept <extension>.We are capable of inferring from the bare
concept <extension> a necessary truth regarding other concepts, e.g., <triangle>,
etc. and this phenomenon could only be explained if “this truth [can be found]
originally and implicitly in the initial concept of extension”:
Thus, this truth also lay tangled up, as one might say, in the original concept of extension,
but it escaped our attention and could not be distinctly known and distinguished until,
through analysis, we unpacked all the parts of this concept and separated them from
one another. The analysis of concepts is for the understanding nothing more than what
the magnifying glass is for sight. It does not produce anything that was not to be found
in the object. But it spreads out the parts of the object and makes it possible for our senses
to distinguish much that they would otherwise not have noticed. The analysis of concepts
does nothing different from this; it makes the parts and members of these concepts, which
were previously obscure and unnoticed, distinct and recognizable but it does not introduce
anything into the concepts that was not already to be found in them. (258)
We are in possession of necessary truths, such as those of geometry, and since
our rational capacities do not “introduce” but rather merely recognize represen-
tational content, it must be the case that these truths are realized by virtue of
unpacking given contents. The claim regarding the structure of concepts follows
from the epistemological claim as to what can be achieved with nothing but a
bare concept and the magnifying glass of analysis:
[T]here is no doubt that all geometric truths that geometry teaches us to unpack or untangle
from the concept of extension must be encountered all tangled up in it. For what else can
the profoundest inferences do but analyze a concept and make distinct what was obscure?
Such inferences cannot bring in what is not to be found in the concepts, and it is easy to see
that it is also not possible, by means of the principle of contradiction, to derive from the
concept what is not to be found in it. (257)¹⁵
For Mendelssohn, we can acquire knowledge regarding what might have seemed
like newly formed concepts (such as <triangle>) just through analysis of <exten-
sion>. In both the quoted passages above, Mendelssohn’s language clearly antic-
ipates not just Kant’s characterization of analytic judgment,¹⁶ but also his char-
acterization of the first geometer in preface to the Critique. It cannot be,
 See Shabel (2006) for discussion.
 In terms of predicates “already thought” in the concept in the subject position of a judgment
(e.g. CPR A 7/B 11, B 15) and also of predicates determinable through the principle of non-
contradiction alone (e.g. CPR A 7–8/B 11– 12, A 151/B 190).
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Mendelssohn says, that the inferences a geometer performs “introduces anything
into the concepts” or that the inferences performed might themselves “bring in”
representational content, since our inferential capacity is essentially a recogni-
tional capacity, thus one that we direct towards pre-existing contents located
within an initial concept’s implicit discursive structure. By contrast, even by
this Pre-Critical point Kant was already claiming that the performance of infer-
ences might themselves “bring in” representational content and thereby consti-
tute the possession conditions for mathematical concepts.
Like Kant though, Mendelssohn claims that the power of geometry’s individ-
ual signs is that they “agree in their nature and connection with the nature and
connection of the thoughts” and that for example “lines are placed together in
figures in the same manner as the concepts are placed together in our soul”
(264). Although not as perspicuous in its procedure as geometry, in metaphysics
“the same certainty reigns”. Mendelssohn acknowledges though that metaphys-
ical conclusions, since formed through analysis, can be understood as just
claims regarding the connections between concepts, and as such merely express
“possibilities”. The task of the metaphysician is in a sense more demanding than
that of the mathematician, since although the latter can establish her conclu-
sions without direct appeal to the existence of things to which those conclusions
apply, metaphysical propositions often aspire to express claims just about the ex-
istence of things (such as the self or God), and so now “the important step into
the realm of actuality must take place” (274). Despite the metaphysician’s meth-
od being identical to that of the mathematician, and despite the fact the math-
ematician cannot step into the realm of actuality, Mendelssohn claims that the
movements are in fact easily achieved by the metaphysician. Mendelssohn
cites as examples the cogito and the ontological argument and claims that
“[w]e have Descartes to thank for these two transitions from the possible to
the actual” (275–276). For Mendelssohn these two claims are as well founded
as the propositions of geometry. The conclusions of both essays are then radical-
ly at odds. In the Inquiry, Kant diagnosed the failures of metaphysics as based on
the assumption of a shared methodology with mathematics, only to discover that
the prize-winning submission was one that argued that, just by virtue of the
shared methodology of the analysis of concepts, our acquisition of knowledge
of God’s existence was as straightforward a matter as that of acquiring knowl-
edge of the properties of triangles.
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4 The Critical Account
By the time Kant presented his account of mathematical cognition in the first Cri-
tique, nearly two decades later, his view of knowledge per se had changed entire-
ly. The change could be expressed by contrasting it with the rationalist model of
knowledge that Mendelssohn’s essay epitomized, namely that of successful anal-
ysis. The achievement of veridical representation was modelled as achieved
through the purification of acts of thinking. The transition from the state of lack-
ing knowledge to the state of possessing it is to be understood as the Leibnizian
transition from a state of indistinct and obscure thought to clear and distinct
thought (CPR A 270–271/B 326–327). The confusion of obscure thought is due
to the impurities of sensory representations infecting the capacity of thought it-
self. As well as our discursive capacities, such as the understanding and reason,
Kant claims we also possess a range of non-discursive capacities. Amongst those
non-discursive representational capacities are the familiar ones of the sensory
modalities, memory and imagination. The Critique though marks the recognition
of the requirement of a further, distinct type of non-discursive representational
capacity, that of intuition.¹⁷ In a broader sense Kant’s project is motivated by
the denial of the rationalist picture, and by the thought of the necessary co-de-
ployment of both discursive and non-discursive capacities as the jointly suffi-
cient conditions for knowledge acquisition.
By 1781, Kant had discovered that individual signs, in the form of intuitions,
were required for the expression of propositional knowledge relating to both
mathematical and metaphysical concepts. Kant’s endorsement of the discursivity
thesis holds that veridical representation, rather than being an achievement of
pure thought, is instead a distinct epistemic achievement involving both concep-
tualization and the input of non-conceptual individual signs (qua intuition) in a
single cognitive act, i.e. cognition. A crucial aspect of this model is that for Kant
our intuitional capacity can also be activated imaginationally, whereby we can
access the intuitional outputs without directly activating any of our sensory mo-
dalities.When this activity of the interaction of our imaginational and intuitional
capacities occurs, the representations produced in imaginational space are
“pure” (CPR B 3).
In the ‘dogmatic use’ section Kant repeats his claim from the Inquiry that
there is an essential difference between the methods of metaphysics and math-
ematics. This difference is now expressed though in terms of a procedure that is
 For the role of the intuitional capacity as one contributing its own representational content
see Warren (1998) and Waxman (2005).
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peculiar to mathematics, that of construction, and explains why definitions can
only be provided in mathematics:
Thus there remain no other concepts that are fit for being defined than those containing an
arbitrary synthesis which can be constructed a priori; and thus only mathematics has def-
initions. For the object that it thinks it also exhibits a priori in intuition, and this can surely
contain neither more nor less than the concept, since through the explanation of the con-
cept the object is originally given, i.e., without the explanation being derived from any-
where else. (CPR A 729–730/B 757–758).
Kant’s account of construction involves the amalgamation of several of the key
claims seen before: construction itself is nothing but the acquisition of concepts
through acts of definition, where the latter is understood as manifested within
the inferences performed upon individual signs. Only through this procedure
can certain objects even be known, since those individual signs are constitutive
of the proof-procedures that must be performed to acquire geometrical knowl-
edge. Whereas before the deployment of individual signs had been a mere
“aid to thought”, Kant now views the representation of particulars as necessary
for the very capacity to represent the objects that fall under our concepts.
Kant uses a different geometrical proof to express this point, proposition I.32
of the Elements. As he had done in the Inquiry, Kant contrasts the practice of con-
ceptual analysis with the practice of the mathematician:
Give a philosopher the concept of a triangle, and let him try to find out in his way how the
sum of its angles must be related to a right angle. He has nothing but the concept of a figure
enclosed by three straight lines, and in it the concept of equally many angles. Now he may
reflect on this concept as long as he wants, yet he will never produce anything new. He can
analyse and make distinct the concept of a straight line, or of an angle, or of the number
three, but he will not come upon any other properties that do not already lie in these con-
cepts. But not let the geometer take up this question. He begins at once to construct a tri-
angle. Since he knows that two right angles together are exactly equal to all the adjacent
angles that can be drawn at one point on a straight line, he extend one side of his triangle,
and obtains two adjacent angles that together are equal to two right ones. Now he divides
the external one of these angles by drawing a line parallel to the opposite side of the tri-
angle, and sees that here there arises an external adjacent angle which is equal to an in-
ternal one, etc. In such a way, through a chain of inferences that is always guided by intu-
ition, he arrives at a fully illuminating and at the same time general solution of the
question. (CPR A 716–717/B 745).¹⁸
 The use of this example was not uncommon, though I’d suggest that Kant was inspired here
by Leibniz’s use of I.32 in the New Essays (Book IV, Ch. ii, § 2: 367). Leibniz describes the
demonstrative reasoning employed in proving Proposition I.32 as a “chain of items of intuitive
knowledge [enchaînement des connaissances intuitives]” just as Kant describes the reasoning
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Here Kant describes the proof performed in the Elements (see Figure 2).
Figure 2:  
A E
B C D
Briefly, the proof proceeds as follows: we construct a triangle ABC, then extend
BC to point D, and draw a line CE that is parallel to BA. We see that the angle
⦣abc is identical to that at ⦣ecd. Since AC is a transversal of two parallel
lines, the opposing angles at ⦣bac and ⦣ace are equal. We see then that the in-
ternal angles of ABC are equal to the sum of ⦣ecd, ⦣ace and ⦣acb. Furthermore,
that latter set of angles are together equal to the sum of two right angles, since
we can see that those angles together rest upon the straight line BD. Thus the
internal angles of ABC must be equal to the sum of two right angles.
The claim is that this proof procedure for establishing proposition I.32 is not
performed through conceptual analysis alone.¹⁹ There are two senses in which
the proof is “always guided by intuition” however. Firstly, there is the simple
point that the drawn diagram is a deployment of an individual sign. Secondly,
though, there is the epistemic suasive sense in which certain steps of the
proof take place (to repeat Kant’s claim from the Inquiry) “with the degree of as-
surance characteristic of seeing something with one’s own eyes”. At crucial
points in the diagram we are supposed just to see, in both the visual and epis-
temic senses, that the angle ⦣abc is the same as ⦣ecd; similarly, we are supposed
just to see that ⦣acb is shared in common between the triangle and the angles
with regard to the same proposition as proceeding through a “chain of inferences [eine Kette von
Schlüssen] that is always guided by intuition”.
 E.g. Friedman (1985), Shabel (2003; 2006).
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that go to make the straight line BD. The epistemic intuitiveness of the proof is
for Kant a product of the use of the representation of spatial particulars.
This allows for an understanding of the original import of Kant’s use of the
example of the first geometer in the B preface. There Kant praised the first geo-
meter for recognizing that the nature of the task at hand involved neither an em-
piricist “reading off” of properties from a drawn figure – all that would do would
be to present a series of images of three straight lines laid end-to-end – nor a
rationalist reading off from the unpacked intension of a given concept, but in-
stead drawing out from the proof procedure what the geometer had himself
put in. Far from our being able to untangle the concept <extension> into all
the truths of geometry, Kant is simply challenging Mendelssohn (and Wolffians
in general) to untangle the conceptual content <sum of interior angles necessarily
equal to the sum of two right angles> from the initial concept <figure enclosed by
three straight lines laid end-to-end>. No matter how far we decompose that con-
cept, Kant thinks, the former constituent just won’t reveal itself. Applying the
magnifying glass of analysis to the latter and “spreading out all its parts” reveals
nothing more than the spread-out parts: <figure>, <three>, <straight>, <line>, etc.
and not the propositional knowledge that intuition can reveal.²⁰
5 The Distinction Between Mathematics and
Metaphysics
The ‘philosopher’ targeted in the Euclidean example section is Mendelssohn,
and the practice of transcendental inquiry ought not to be thought of in terms
of his rationalist conception of the philosophical method. Nevertheless, Kant
maintains (i) that transcendental philosophy is properly understood as discur-
sive cognition and (ii) that there are some genuine differences between transcen-
dental philosophy and mathematics. There is the difference firstly that the math-
ematical method constructs its concept through acts of definition, whereas the
philosophical method does not. But it is clear that there are two distinct ele-
ments to the construction procedure that Kant appeals to in the ‘dogmatic
use’ section. Firstly, there is the discursivity thesis, and Kant’s claim from the In-
quiry that in mathematical cognition we think “the universal in the particular”
(CPR A 714/B 742). A second feature however is that in mathematics the concept
can be acquired through the provision of an intuition that one has literally pro-
duced and brought into being through the cooperation of one’s own imagination-
 See CPR A 718–719/B 746–747. Cf. Metaphysik Vigilantius (K3), AA 29:969.
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al and intuitional cognitive capacities – this is what it is for an intuition to be the
product of an a priori exhibition (CPR A 713/B 741).²¹ This second feature is not
shared with metaphysics, since there the opportunities for knowledge depend
on occasions of being given objects whose existence is always accounted for
by some distinct ontological ground. We cannot summon up in the imagination
genuine tokens of the extension of the concept <substance>, for example, though
we can summon up genuine tokens of geometrical figures in imagination. In ex-
tending the demand of intuitions for concept-application to metaphysical con-
cepts, Kant maintains a distinct similarity between metaphysical and mathemat-
ical inquiries; in distinguishing intuitions that can be received from those that
can be exhibited a priori, he retains for himself grounds for the claim that
there is a strict distinction between the two.
Inattentiveness to both these features of the mathematician’s practice that
Kant thinks has had a deleterious effect on metaphysics. While both mathemat-
ics and metaphysics deploy concepts that require the use of intuitions, and to
that extent share a methodology, the former can deploy intuitions by acts of
will and imagination. It is due to this latter feature that we can define mathemat-
ical concepts, since we can stipulate the things to which they refer by bringing
their referents into being. To presume that we could do this with regard to meta-
physical concepts however would be to abandon the claim that our experience of
empirical reality is essentially restricted by the receptive nature of human cogni-
tion. Transcendental philosophy concerns the conditions of a possible rule-like
synthesis of intuitions, but those intuitions must be given, i.e. they can only
be exhibited in experience (CPR A 567/B 595, A 714–715/B 742–743). In this
sense then transcendental philosophy is still cognition merely “from concepts”,
since it must stipulate its claims only with regard to discursive conditions on
possible intuition rather than conceptualized instances of actual token intu-
itions.
Kant’s construction procedure therefore essentially involves the cognitive
achievement of producing an individual sign just out of one’s own representa-
tional resources. The notion of providing an intuition a priori must be under-
stood literally – with the mathematical use of reason “we can determine our con-
cepts a priori in intuition, for we create the objects themselves in space and
time” (CPR A 723/B 751). Through the act of construction we define a concept
and thereby bring that concept into being for the first time, just as Kant had
held in the Inquiry; in the Critique, though, Kant maintains that a further feature
 Cf. CPR B 65–66, where Kant states that in geometry “[y]ou must therefore give your object a
priori in intuition, and ground your synthetic proposition on this.” See also CPR A 234/B 387.
18 John Callanan
of the creation of the concept is that it can occur through a presentation of an
individual sign that the agent herself has also created and that is both necessary
and sufficient as a genuine member of the extension of that concept. Although I
can draw a triangle on paper, I may also do so in the pure imagination. When I
perform the latter task, I am not dependent on being given any empirical objects
in order to engage in the construction procedure and yet that imaginational tri-
angle nevertheless counts as a genuine member of concept’s extension.²²
When Kant expresses the difference between the metaphysical and mathe-
matical methods, it is invariably with appeal to this feature of construction. In
his metaphysics lectures he characterizes concept construction as occurring
when an a priori intuition is produced and where the latter is understood as
“that which everyone can give to himself”.²³ Mathematical inquiry has a distinct
method for Kant, though only because mathematical concepts can be acquired
via imaginational intuition, without the prompting of sensory stimuli from
given empirical objects. Were metaphysics to share the exact same method of
mathematics, this would entail our having the representational resources to pro-
duce empirical intuitions in our imagination corresponding to the Categories. To
assume this though would be to ascribe to human representation a capacity akin
to the intellectual intuition of a divine being, for whom thought of any object,
empirical objects included, is coterminous with an act of that object’s being
brought into existence (CPR A 252/B 308).
Kant’s aims in the dogmatic use section, stemming from the Inquiry, are not
just to contrast his own metaphysical method with that of mathematics but also
to point to aspects of similarity, by attending to the actual reasoning practices of
the mathematician. His claim is that the metaphysical tradition has mischarac-
terized the method that it seeks to emulate. When the mathematical method is
correctly characterized, both the differences and similarities between the proper
methods of metaphysics can be more clearly appreciated. Kant attempts to dem-
onstrate this by showing how the paradigmatic epistemic achievement of geo-
metrical knowledge is properly characterized not along rationalist lines, as an
achievement of clear and distinct abstract thought, but rather as that of the con-
ceptually informed cognition of spatiotemporally represented particulars.²⁴
 CPR A 722/B 750, note.
 Metaphysics L2, AA 28:532. See also the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, AA
4:470, 4:486–488, On a Discovery, AA 8:192, note.
 For comments on earlier talks from which this paper is drawn, I would like to thank au-
diences at King’s College London, Cambridge, University of Amsterdam, Humboldt University
and University of California at Berkeley, as well as an anonymous referee.
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